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GLOBALIZATION VERSUS SECURITIZATION: BORDERS AND MIGRATION A CASE STUDY OF HUNGARIAN POLICY TOWARDS MIGRATION 2015-2019

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Abstract

This paper aims to investigate the issue of migration from two different perspectives. The first one is the globalization perspective, which calls for the removal of borders in front of the movement of money, business and people and believes that the presence of any restrictions on the movement of people, especially immigrants from the scourge and tragedies of wars, are incompatible with the principles and values called for by the liberals. The second one is the securitization perspective, which transforms the issue of migration from being a social and humanitarian issue into a security issue. This tendency is enhanced through the discourse and rhetoric of the securitizing actor or group of actors who portray it as an immediate security danger, which threatens both the society and the state. In this regard, the paper examines briefly the European policies towards migration issue, especially since 2015. Through focusing on Hungarian policies towards migration issue as a case study, the main contribution of this paper is to examine to what extent this case reflects one of two perspectives; globalization or securitization in dealing with this important global issue. Accordingly, the paper's methodology is based on using the case study as the unit of analysis and utilizing discourse analysis and explanatory approach. Through analyzing the Hungarian leaders' discourse and policies on the migration issue, the paper concluded that the Hungarian policies regarding migration have precisely reflected an honest application of the securitization theory and have been very far from the principles of liberalism and globalization.

Keywords: Migration, Asylum Seekers, Hungary, European Agenda on Migration, Globalization, Securitization, Syrian Refugees

1. Introduction

The migration issue has become a prominent concern and a high-priority policy issue on both internal and international levels. Migration has progressively been considered a profound issue as it inevitably influences the economic growth, the human development and the security of the relevant states (McAuliffe and Ruhs, 2018). In 2015, there was an inflation in the numbers of migrants applying for asylum in the European Union. Most of these migrants come from ME region which was suffering internal wars such as Syria and Iraq. These huge numbers of migrants have been a real challenge for the European Union and its Member States.

Throughout the literature studying migration, two distinctive perspectives arise through which this significant phenomenon can be analyzed: liberalism and securitization theory. On

one side, liberalism asserts that the profound arising of globalization has made the notion of “state sovereignty” vulnerable. Accordingly, liberal political theorists believe that mobility constrictions contradict with the main principles of liberalism and consequently cannot be justified by nation states which claim to embrace these liberal values (Bauder, 2015). On the other side, securitization theory concentrates on how social issues are constructed into security issues. In securitization process, an issue goes from non-politicized to politicized and finally to a securitized issue (Williams, 2010; Wennerhed, 2016). In this regard, migration has been recognized as a security issue. Previously, migration was predominantly studied as an important issue in the fields of sociology, anthropology and history. Buzan *et al.* (1998) who emphasize the non-military aspects of security, were among the first scholars supposing that there is a solid relation between migration and security. The key argument here is that immigration flows can harshly threaten the security and stability of not only the nation-states but also the international order (Norden, 2016; Messina, 2014).

In the light of these different perspectives, the paper aims to analyze the Hungarian polices towards immigration and the extent to which it comes up with the European Union strategy reflected in the European Agenda on Migration in 2015. Accordingly, the paper will seek to answer the following questions: What are the main aspects of the debate regarding the relationship between globalization, migration, and security? What is the Hungarian government’s approach towards migration and what are the main Migration policies it adopted? To what extent have the Hungarian government’s actions contradicted the goals and measures under the European Agenda on Migration? How can Hungarian policies be explained in the light of the securitization theory?

The methodology of this research is based on using the case study as the unit of analysis and utilizing discourse analysis and explanatory approach in seeking to answer the main research questions. Through focusing on Hungarian policies towards migration issue as a case study, the key contribution of this paper is to examine to what extent this case reflects one of two theoretical perspectives in tackling this critical global issue; globalization which is based on liberal principles, and the securitization theory that emerges from the security theory in international relations.

Accordingly, the paper starts with a brief overview of the difference between those two approaches; globalization and securitization on the migration issue. It, then, proceeds with a brief overview of the main European policies regarding the migration since 2015 identifying key agenda, policies and practices. Building on the basis of difference among the EU member states, the paper then analyzes the Hungarian securitizing discourse and policies on migration as a case study using discourse analysis and explanatory approach. Thus, the paper will be divided into four sections and conclusion as follow: Globalization and migration, securitization of migration, the main EU policies towards migration since 2015, Hungarian policies towards migration since 2015, and conclusion.

2. Globalization and migration

According to the neo-liberals, the overwhelming rising of globalization open all the borders to the flows of commodities, capital, and information throughout international boundaries. Therefore, the logic of the global capitalist system requires also a free movement of labor. Free trade, transnational company investment and the rapid movement of capital between global financial institutions, make labor movement inevitable (Richmond, 2010).

According to World Economic Forum (2017), globalization is the process by which people and goods move easily across borders. As such, there is no globalization without human migration. Truly, with globalization, the flows of goods, capital, and information across international borders have been liberalized. Nevertheless, the movement of people across these same borders is still extremely restricted. Consequently, borders continue to be a key source of human misery and discriminations (Bauder, 2015). Some liberal political theorists believe that such mobility restrictions violate the main principles of liberalism. Therefore, these restraints cannot be justified by states which assert that they adopt such liberal principles (Bauder, 2017).

Actually, many liberalists assert that in a global community of humanity, it is indisputable liberty for any person to enter into a state's territory and stay in it (Carens, 1987). Some liberalists have built on these liberal calls for open borders so, they assert that the principle of human equality and hence the right to free movement have superiority over other liberal principles such as the communities right to delineate their membership (Bauder, 2015). In this regard, Carens (1987) argues that the citizens of a nation state may receive considerable benefits from preventing migrants from entering their countries. Nevertheless, the disadvantages which could be resulted through denying the probable migrants the right of crossing the border typically balance these benefits which might be achieved. Accordingly, the collective value of open borders will be increased benefiting the persons who are involved in and affected by the migration process. Consequently, Carens (1987) asserts that borders must be opened.

Other liberal proponents of open borders have proposed a rights-based argument which suggests that "freedom of movement is a basic human right". Accordingly, controlled borders constitute an unblemished violation of the human rights as they cause a severe harm for migrants' interests and their rights to improve their lives or escape harassment, poverty or war (Bauder, 2015). Consequently, the institutional and structural violence practiced against the migrants as a result of border restrictions cannot be justified morally as it is institutional violation of the basic human rights of life and freedom (Scarpellino, 2007). In fact, some analysts who defend open borders have referred to a prominent 'liberal paradox', which reflects the contradiction between the liberal calls for open borders and the urgings that borders must be controlled to secure liberal territorial polities and societies (Bauder, 2015).

The migrants' suffering has provoked scholars to call for "open borders for people and for no border". They assert the importance of the open-borders and no-border concepts and criticize the current border policies and practices. In this regard, they indicate the disastrous deaths of thousands of migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea. This immoral tragedy demonstrates the catastrophic human consequences of hindering people from crossing international boundaries. Some of these scholars believe that existing border practices reinforce a system of 'global apartheid' (Bauder, 2015).

3. Securitization of migration

Securitization is said to be the process by which apparently non security issues, such as immigration, are turned to be critical security concerns as a result of securitizing speech acts (Messina, 2014). Buzan *et al.* (1998) and Messina (2014) explain the relation between migration and security and think that the process of securitization starts when an actor (or group of actors) identifies something as existentially threatens the survival of a political society or a state and suggests that this threat needs extraordinary procedures which exceed the rules of normal politics to deal with it. The process of securitization is then accomplished when the actor's intended audience acknowledges all these ingredients as given and the securitizing discourse is preserved and extended (Norden, 2016; Wennerhed, 2016).

The main idea behind the securitization theory is that security is a 'speech act'. In other words, according to the Copenhagen School, there are no security issues in themselves, but only issues which are constructed as such by certain actors - called 'securitizing actors' - through speech acts (Leonard, 2007).

In this regard, Balzacq (2005) also argues that securitization can be described as a strategic practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction. Therefore, the general process of securitization is said to embark whenever elite actors embed "low politics" public policy issues into the domain of "high politics" by endorsing the rhetoric of existential threat. Accordingly, the securitization process is eventually intersubjective as it takes the form of elites' planned rhetoric, rarely supported by objective evidence. Therefore, the securitizing actor needs to convince his audience that his claims are valid so he can influence them and acquire their support to transfer the threatening

issue out of the realm of conventional politics and into the sphere of emergency politics to be confronted straightway (Messina, 2014).

Accordingly, several analysts and politicians believed that migration is a security issue. Before being considered and studied as a security issue, migration was mainly studied in the fields of sociology, anthropology and history (Norden, 2016). Currently, migration is considered as a security issue by approximately all the European countries. In this regard, "securitization" of immigration has attained more prominence recently. Thus, the general argument goes that population flows can pose a threat to the security and stability of nation-states and also the international order. In this context, the securitization of immigration is described as a top down process, in which many political, societal and security elites realize migration as a threat to vital values of communities and states. According to Waever (1995), by definition, something is a security problem when elites declare it to be so.

Accordingly, securitization theory challenges conventional approaches to security in IR by affirming that issues are not fundamentally threatening in themselves, but it is by announcing them as 'security' issues that they become security concerns (Award, 2018).

Essentially, security issues have arisen to exceptional peaks on the relevant internal and global agendas of Western countries since September 11. Political elites have rhetorically linked immigrants with several cultural, economic, and social security threats and framed immigrants as societal adversaries in public discourse thus, exacerbated pervasive insecurities. These tendencies have led to the securitization of immigration and accelerated the implementation of increasingly restraining immigration and asylum procedures. Accordingly, September 11 is considered as a serious turning point in and a key engine of the process of securitizing immigration in Europe and the United States. On the other side, some scholars think that the elite's worries about immigration's negative effects precede September 11 and the later terrorist incidents in Europe. Accordingly, they believe that immigration has long been "securitized (Messina, 2014). In this regard it is thought that the security studies faced a crisis after 1989-91 which led to insert various 'new insecurities' into the field of analysis (Huysmans and Squire, 2009). Therefore, some analysts believe that the current framing of immigration as a terrorist threat uses traditional rhetorical arguments which return back to the late nineteenth century (D'Appollonia, 2012). Even though, those terrorist attacks have converted natural worries related to migration into security threats, thus triggering the securitizing of immigration (Messina, 2014).

In this regard, it is important not to conflate the politicization of immigration with the securitization of immigration. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between two concepts: the "politicization of immigration", which means remove the issue from restricted bureaucracies and instill it into the public field and the "securitization of immigration", which incorporates migration broadly and institutionally into security frames that concentrate on policing and defense. Accordingly, while the politicization of immigration is a neutral and an occasionally positive process, the securitization of immigration tends to be neither neutral nor constructive (Messina, 2014; Bourbeau, 2011).

Some analysts asserted that the new waves of migration such as Latin American immigrants in the United States and Middle Easterners in Europe, are different from preceding waves of immigrants they prefer to live in ethnic ghettos instead of integrating in the society, considering this tendency as the main threatening keystone (D'Appollonia, 2012).

4. The main EU policies towards migration since 2105

The 2015 migration crisis in the European Union (EU) has been realized as a multi-faced issue which reflects diverse policy problems such as fears of terrorism, economic prosperity, border control, issues of identity and a broad European responsibility for refugees (Gobl, 2015). Actually, the discourse analysis of different EU documents has indicated that the perception of immigration as a real threat to the internal security of EU member states had three keystones: the link between immigration and crime; the link between immigration and economic instability; and the link between immigration and instability caused by xenophobia and racism (Furuseth, 2003). With the increasing number of migrants and refugees knocking on Europe's doors, there

have been a lot of policies and procedures taken at the EU political level. In the diverse conferences held in Europe since then, EU leaders have concentrated on external and security dimensions of the migration challenge. A lot of policies and decisions have been taken to deal with this emergent threat caused by the growing influx of asylum seekers.

4.1. A European agenda on migration 2015

To confront the difficult challenges raised by the refugee crisis, the EU Commission developed the European Agenda on Migration in 2015. EU has formulated its Agenda of migration policy which is founded on four bases: reducing the incentives for irregular migration, border management, a common asylum policy, and a new policy on legal migration (Ruhrmann and FitzGerald, 2016). The European countries have initiated different policies to limit regular and irregular migration movements at and within their borders. Moreover, a lot of governments have tried to stop incoming migrants before they reach their final destination. Accordingly, externalization is not a new phenomenon. In the post-cold war era, a lot of practices were used to achieve this goal such as offshoring of border checks, asylum processing, interdictions and migrant detention (Zaiotti, 2016). Accordingly, the development of EU remote control policies during 2015 has been established within this broad policy which builds on the efforts started since 1990 to restrict flows of refugees and other migrants before reaching the boundaries of the EU (Ruhrmann and FitzGerald, 2016; European Commission, 2014).

In 2015, there was an unprecedented inflation in the numbers of refugees applying for asylum in the EU. Most of these refugees came from the Middle East countries such as Syria and Iraq destructed by wars. These refugees, seeking for protection and security have been an ominous challenge for the European Union and its Member States (European Commission, 2017).

These refugees have been portrayed as a threat to the national security of Western States. "Islamic State" (IS) threatened to send half a million refugees through Libya to Europe and to send 4,000 jihadists fighters to Europe through Turkey. This threat has led to frame these groups of refugees as a security issue. Actually, this threat has provoked a big fear of refugees and migration in general throughout Europe and led to the securitization of this issue (Schmid, 2016).

4.2. The policy of European Union towards the migration

The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was one of a set of policies which the European Union has initiated to deal with the migration issue. Since 1999, the EU has sought to create such a common System and improve the existing legislative framework. Accordingly, between 1999 and 2005, it approved several legislative measures which aim to have common minimum standards for asylum (European Commission, 2014).

Moreover, The Policy Plan endorsed in June 2008, identified three bases to enhance the (CEAS) as follows: aligning the EU States' asylum legislation so as to better achieve harmonization to standards of protection, coordinating effectively in implementing the agreed policies, enhancing the cooperation among EU States, and between the EU and non-EU countries. Thus, EU agreed upon new schemes to ensure that asylum seekers are treated in the same way according to an open and fair system wherever they apply (European Commission, 2014).

On 13 May 2015, the EU adopted the European Agenda on Migration, which presented immediate- and medium-term actions devised to deal with the crisis more efficiently (European Commission, 2015).

Despite the commitment of EU member states to a collective obligation towards refugees, little progress has been achieved and thus, the collaborative approach to asylum proved to be elusive in practice on the EU level. Nevertheless, it can be referred to the main initiatives and policies, which have been taken by the EU on the collective level through its institutions as follow:

- EU's Regional Trust Fund.
- The system for relocation and resettlement of persons in need of protection.
- The externalization of the asylum problem through EU readmission agreements and three-year regional protection program (RPP) for the Middle East states to help them addressing the issue of the Syrian refugees.

EU's Regional Trust Fund was established in December 2014. It aims to support refugees and host communities, especially in Syria's neighboring countries, by addressing the immense and increasing needs in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt. Accordingly, it can be said that this Fund can be considered as a component of the externalization process of the asylum problem outside the EU borders and aims to enhance this policy (Hoel, 2015).

On the other side, on 8 June 2015, the European Commission offered an EU-wide resettlement scheme which intended to achieve balance among member states regarding the Syrian and Eritrean nationals who entered Italy or Greece after 15 April 2015 and need international protection. On 9th of September 2015, the European Commission introduced a proposal to relocate 120,000 refugees from Italy, Greece and Hungary to other EU Member States during the following two years. The Commission also suggested a Permanent Relocation Mechanism for all member states which can be used to help any EU-member state suffering severe pressure on its asylum system because of a massive and unbalanced influx of third country nationals. Nevertheless, this relocation system has been considered as a temporary procedure rather than a conclusive solution for this crisis (Hoel, 2015).

The externalization of the asylum problem is based on the fact that EU member states have focused on transferring asylum applications to non- members third countries instead of focusing on achieving a common asylum system within the borders of the EU. Externalization policy aims to support the regional protection programs and reception centers in non-EU countries, encourage the refugees to return to third countries and signing readmission treaties (Frelick, 2016; Ruhrmann and FitzGerald, 2016).

Essentially, the Syrian refugees crisis has revealed that the EU decided to transfer the responsibility to safeguard those refugees to non-member third countries. This tendency generates a lot of severe humanitarian, economic and social challenges for these neighboring host countries. Moreover, almost all the host countries, with the exception of Turkey, are not signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the status of refugees. Accordingly, instead of receiving the refugee status, Syrian and other refugees have been treated as guests – a position which gives them no legal protection (Ferris and Kirisci, 2016).

Actually, EU has established a three-year regional protection program for the Middle East to address the issue of the Syrian refugees. Launched in July of 2014, it aims to provide support to Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq to enhance their reception capacities for refugees. Moreover, EU readmission agreements with countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, represent another aspect of the externalization of the EU's asylum policies and practices. On the other side, EU did not activate its Temporary Protection Directive (2001) which is thought to be implemented in case of mass influx of displaced persons.

The response of the European institutions can be explained as a result of conflicting opinions among EU Member States. The response of EU Member States to the refugee crisis in general can be described as a study in contrasts. It is a challenging task to reach common policies when EU Member States strongly disagree on what to do. For example, the conservative Visegrad countries, Eastern European countries, UK and Denmark have obstructed coming up with common European plan regarding the influx of Syrian refugees. Although CEAS aims to provide joint guarantees for the protection of migrants and access to joint and unified systems at the level of the European Union, what actually was achieved is completely different from that. Conditions of reception and acceptance rates differ between the countries of the European Union significantly. Hence, the European Union still has a long way to go in order to achieve the goal of creating a single refugee protection zone. Apparently, there are great differences among member states on what EU should do (Hoel, 2015).

At the level of the European Union, the response of these countries to the refugee crisis has been largely contradictory. The study of those countries' responses to that crisis can

be divided into three distinct categories: the liberal response, the moderate response, and the restrictive response. Germany and Sweden have reflected the liberal response, as the two countries welcomed and introduced protection for asylum seekers, especially Syrians. Hence, their response is based on their perception of EU as a defender of liberal and human values. As for the moderate response, it came from Italy, which formulated policies dependent on the assistance of the European Union. Hence, its response has based on the merging of the pragmatic and normative perception of the EU. Finally, the restrictive response came from countries, foremost among them Hungary, and based on xenophobia and anti-migration, and therefore its response was based on pragmatic thought that sees the European Union as an entity that promotes regional security and restrains the threats that may encounter it. In light of this, it can be said that the European Union wishes, but it cannot constitute a united front to defend peace and human rights (Hoel, 2015).

5. Hungarian policies towards migration since 2015

5.1. The Hungarian securitized discourse and policies

The Hungarian policies and rhetoric have been directed to securitize the immigration issue. Accordingly, the right – wing government and its prime minister declared their refusal to receive immigrants. Orbán indicated to the Othman state's history and said that Muslim asylum seekers are unwelcome in Hungary (Frelak, 2017).

The analysis of the official discourse from January 2015 shows a stout, antagonistic and racialized rhetoric against migrants, which served as the major legitimizing factor in introducing the Hungarian restrictive policies (Gobl, 2015). For example, he portrayed the refugees inflow as an invasion. According to him, the refugees inflowing to Europe “look like an army”. He declared that Hungary cannot deal with immigration problem, since it does not have any experience of “multiculturalism”. This point is used to legitimize some anti-immigration initiatives such as the border fence (Hoel, 2015).

Actually, a lot of policies and procedures were taken by Hungarian government to face the refugees problem. These policies include strengthening border controls and declaring a state of emergency in a number of its cities. Moreover, the government sought to amend the Asylum Law which came into force in August 2015. The amended law gives the authorities authority to reject asylum applications from refugees coming from Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq who already passed through other “safe” countries and did not introduce their claims there. Hungary on the other hand, has sought to strengthen border controls through declaring emergency state and constructing a 175-kilometer fence in September 2015 on its border with Serbia to prevent irregular refugees from crossing its borders. On its side, the Hungarian Parliament has issued a law which permits the government to use the military forces to deal with asylum seekers at its boundaries. This law also allows the government to use of non-lethal force such as rubber shots and tear gas bombs against them (Hoel, 2015).

As a part of a “National Consultation on Immigration” the government sent out a survey to Hungarian people in May 2015 concerning the government's policies towards the immigration. It was aimed to attain support for the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's restraining approach. This survey was not more than a propaganda questionnaire with questionable methodology, biased and suggestive questions (Gobl, 2015). It embodied questions such as: “Do you agree that mistaken immigration policies contribute to the spread of terrorism?” or “Do you agree with the government that instead of allocating funds to immigration we should support Hungarian families and those children yet to be born?” (Hoel, 2015)

The language used in the migration-related consultation was an integral part of the securitization frame constructed by FIDESZ: it describes migrants as terrorists, and as a source of economic and cultural threat. Essentially, the government supported the anti -migrant billboard campaign which carried a clear message of refusing immigration. The campaign was very hostile with slogans like “if you come to Hungary, you need to abide our laws/respect our culture” and you cannot take away the jobs of Hungarians” (Gobl, 2015).

In addition, the Hungarian government tended to adopt rougher migration policies during the anti-quota referendum's campaign. Hence, it abandoned the integration advantage in

June 2016, which had earlier been offered to the persons under international protection. This tendency has been compatible with the government's obvious movements which refuses integration and consider it as unbearable threat (Juhasz and Zgut, 2017).

Accordingly, the government locked some of the main refugees reception centers. It closed the country's largest open-door reception center in Debrecen back in late 2015. Since then, this procedure has contributed in decreasing the capacity of the refugee system. Additionally, in 2016, the government closed the reception center at Nagyf and the fairly well-equipped refugee camp at Bicske, whilst the tent camp at K.rmend which has been built as a provisional solution became permanent. Furthermore, in November 2016, the Hungarian government implemented new procedures which essentially mean that the refugee system has been disassembled. Since then, asylum seekers were permitted only to fill their applications in the transit zones at R.szke or Tompa, on weekdays only. According to the data of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, about ten individuals were permitted to cross the fence daily both at R.szke and Tompa, which basically means that the refugee system has been diminished (Juhasz and Zgut, 2017).

In March 2017, a lot of other procedures were endorsed, which imposed more restrictions on immigration. The police have been given the authority to take any immigrant residing illegally in Hungary to the other side of the border fence, which actually means that the "8-kilometre-rule" approved in July 2016 has been employed for the entire country. Furthermore, asylum-seekers who have been allowed to enter the transit zones will be kept in custody and are *only* permitted to leave the transit zones towards Serbia or Croatia. Moreover, all adult refugees and all unaccompanied children between the ages of 14 and 18 will be preserved in custody in the transit zones without any chance of judicial appraisal. The government claimed that the crisis triggered by mass immigration has led to the implementation of such measures (Juhasz and Zgut, 2017).

Hungary authorities have been demonizing refugees and migrants. Taxes had been enforced on NGO's who work on migration and asylum seeks issues (Nagy, 2016). According to several human rights organizations, Hungarian authorities hit, assault and cause severe injury to migrants. Those migrants say that Hungarian forces which assumed the protection the borders regularly beat them, use rubber sticks or let their dogs loose to chase after asylum-seekers nearby the Serbian border. Some media sources said that doctors in Belgrade have treated some injured persons who claimed that their injuries were resulted from the Hungarian police behavior since the end of February 2017. On its side, Hungarian authorities denied these claims and considered them as a political attack which aims to shrink Hungarian border protection efforts. Nevertheless, no significant enquiry has ever been launched to investigate these accusations (Juhasz and Zgut, 2017).

Moreover, the governmental media in Hungary presents several clips that enhance the campaign against migrants. An example of this offensive image is the display of pictures of government officials wearing medical masks while interacting with migrants (Gobl, 2015).

5.2. Hungarian's violations of its migration strategy and European and international commitments

Essentially, the Hungarian measures violate its migration strategy and the European and international commitments. This xenophobic tone and all anti- migration policies which have been taken by the Hungarian government (messaging of the anti-migrant billboard campaign, the national consultation, the amendments to the Asylum Act, the procedures to strengthening of its border controls, the fence and the 2016 referendum campaign) has contradicted not only with to the aims and objectives of Hungary's migration strategy but also with European commitments concerning immigration and asylum. Essentially, the Hungarian government has failed to honor its international and European commitments as the Hungarian anti- immigration procedures have meant that the government has failed in providing the asylum seekers in Hungary with the international protection needed and there has been no guarantee that the non-refoulment principle prevails or that the vulnerable immigrants get the required special needs and care (Juhasz and Zgut, 2017).

Moreover, the role of Hungarians has been portrayed as if it was the responsibility of crusaders who defend the borders of Europe from the Muslim threat (Gobl, 2015). In his speech about the migration crisis during the joint press conference with the Bavarian minister-president and Chairman of Germany's conservative CSU party, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said that "Hungary is defending Bavaria's borders today". He added: "It is not for fun that we are doing what we are doing; no one likes serving in a border fortress [...] But this historic role of protecting the external borders has now fallen to Hungary" (Hungarian Government, 2015).

Treating irregular asylum seekers who enter the country as criminals contradicts with the Convention on the Status of Refugees. Moreover, the violations committed by the Hungarian authorities of the right to translation and interpretation in fast-tracked criminal procedures are incompatible with the "Directive on the Right to Interpretation and Translation in Criminal Proceeding". Hungary's resistance to the relocation scheme (quota system) weakens the commonality among member states and breaches the Hungarian and European strategies on migration since both these strategies consider this scheme as a vital part of immigration policy (Juhász and Zgut, 2017).

5.3. The Hungarian position towards the Marrakech compact December 2018

In December 2018, 164 UN states signed the "UN's global compact on safe, orderly and regular migration" following 18 months of negotiation, despite the objections led by the United States. This agreement aimed at coordinating action on migration all over the world (Mcveigh, 2018). Hungary, which has long called for firmer restrictions on European migration, had expressed concerns over the agreement during negotiations. Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijarto criticized it as it describes migration as "a phenomenon that is necessarily only good and favorable and which obviously contributes to the global development" and accordingly he considered it as unbalanced and contradicts with the common sense and with the aim of restoring European security (Specia, 2018).

Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijarto criticized the declaration for portraying migration as "a phenomenon that is necessarily only good and favorable and which obviously contributes to the global development". He said: "We think this is an unbalanced approach and we disagree with it," he said (France 24, 2018). He said also that the agreement contradicted with the common sense and also with the goal of restoring European security. Hungary, which has long called for stricter policies on European migration, had expressed concerns over the agreement during negotiations. Mr. Szijarto said the accord did not address the fundamental human rights of people who want nothing else than to be able to live in peace and security in their own homelands. Accordingly, the Hungarian government refused to sign this agreement as it did not address the principle human rights of people who just need to be able to live in peace and security in their own country (Specia, 2018). Its foreign minister said the focus should be "on how to stop illegal migration and not how to encourage it" and added that they should not deny that migration has very threatening aspects, which have been completely ignored in that international document (France 24, 2018).

How can this Hungarian anti-migration tendency can be explained? There are some factors which might explain this Hungarian anti-immigration tendency. On the one side, Hungary has not a long history of immigration. Moreover, Orbán, who has been its Prime Minister since 2010, is a member of the National Conservative Party and he has been strong opponent to immigration. Accordingly he has sought to securitize the immigration issue and to persuade his people with his anti-immigration position. Added to that, the Hungarian government's rivalry with far right populist party Jobbik can also explain its one-sided and extensively restrictive policies and procedures (Juhász and Zgut, 2017). This can be confirmed by the timing of the Hungarian campaign that started with the sharp deterioration in the popularity of the Prime Minister, the matter which participated in giving rise to its key opponent (Gobl, 2015). On the other side, although the Hungarian economy is not considered amongst the most prosperous European economies, it is not also among the poorest ones. Accordingly, its economic condition cannot be used as a justification for the Hungarian anti-immigration inclination (Juhász and Zgut, 2017).

6. Conclusion

This research paper sought to investigate the migration issue as one of the most important global issues around which a great debate rests. This debate is based on two different theoretical frameworks each of which introduces distinctive evaluation of the migration issue. Accordingly, the research provided an analysis of these two different perspectives: globalization, which is based on the principles of liberalism and securitization, which is based on the theory of security in international relations. In the light of their arguments on the issue of migration, the research paper concentrated on the Hungarian policy towards migration issue to examine to what extent this policy reflects the statements of each theoretical framework. According to securitization theory, political issues are constructed as threatening security issues which must be dealt with urgently when they have been identified as precarious, intimidating and alarming by a securitizing actor who has the authority to move the issue beyond politics.

With the growing number of migrants and refugees knocking on Europe's doors, a lot of policies and procedures have been taken at the EU level. EU leaders have concentrated on security dimensions of the migration challenge and linked it to terrorism and instability. A lot of policies and decisions have been taken to deal with this emergent threat caused by the growing influx of asylum seekers. Though the repeated commitments for a joint harmonized European policy regarding asylum seekers and refugees, a common asylum system in the EU has not yet been completely realized. Accordingly, there are still important variances among member states in terms of refugee protection, reception and living environments, length and excellence of asylum processes, and recognition percentages (Liberal versus conservative). Essentially, EU member states have tried to externalize the migration burden to third parties through focusing on transferring asylum applications to non-member third countries instead of focusing on achieving a common asylum system within the borders of the EU.

Through analyzing the securitizing Hungarian discourse and policies, it is concluded that the xenophobic language and all anti-migration procedures which have been taken by the Hungarian government has precisely reflected the securitization theory and contradicted with the liberal principles of globalization. They also contradict with the aims and objectives of the Hungarian migration strategy and the European commitments related to migration and asylum. Hungary which is a member of the Visegrad Group (V4), has led the opposition to the mandatory relocation scheme for refugees in 2015. Actually, the Hungarian government was among the most conservative EU member states which failed to meet its international and European commitments as the Hungarian anti-immigration procedures have meant that the government has been unsuccessful in offering the asylum seekers in Hungary the international protection required. The paper also concluded that this restrictive and conservative Hungarian tendency towards migration issue can be explained through some reasons. First, Hungary does not have a long history or experience of immigration. Moreover, Orban, the Hungarian Prime Minister since 2010, is a member of the National Conservative Party which opposed migration. Accordingly, he has opposed receiving migrants especially from the Muslim countries. Moreover, the Hungarian government's rivalry with far right populist party, Jobbik can also explain its restrictive policies towards migration.

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