

EURASIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

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FROM 'ADMINISTRATION' TO 'MANAGEMENT' OF DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: A STRUCTURAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVE

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Received: September 21, 2023

Accepted: December 18, 2024

Abstract

The paper endeavors to demonstrate why the multiples structural inequalities of South Africa's economy continue unabated; and, why the socio-economic context of South Africa fails to demonstrate characterizations of having shifted from the age of colonial administration during apartheid to development management thinking and practice in a democratic state. The paper employs a heavy reliance on the conceptual approach to scientific research writing through utilizing secondary literature sources solicited through desktop analysis and survey. Published scientific journal articles, conference proceedings, doctoral thesis and government reports are the cornerstone for the literature review presented in this paper. It finds that the transition from development administration to development management is frustrated by a grim structural and planning heritage of South Africa, chiefly characterized by economic and financial exclusion which cuts across various socio-economic dimension of most rural and urban inhabitants of South Africa. The paper concludes that the realization of development management ideals in South Africa is contingent on appropriate policy design which will direct national, provincial and local government planning and service delivery efforts.

Keywords: Development Administration, Development Management, Financialization, South Africa

1. Introduction

The aim of the paper is to rationalize why the multiple structural inequalities of the economy continue unabated; and, why South Africa fails to demonstrate characterizations of having shifted from the age of colonial administration during apartheid towards development management thinking and practice in a democratic state (Cardo, 2023; Isike, and Ogunnubi, 2017; Meso *et al.* 2016; Gillanders, 2010; Koma, 2013). The paper is purely conceptual and relies on literature-based survey and desktop analysis of secondary sources for its methodological approach. It contributes that various studies have been done around the challenges associated with the transition from the development administration era to the current development management era,

however, little or no concerted effort is given to how financialization, speculative finance and inadequate leadership amongst other structural and policy issues continues the socio-economic landscape of South Africa. It finds that the transition from development administration to development management is frustrated by a grim structural and planning heritage of South Africa, chiefly characterized by economic and financial exclusion which cuts across various socio-economic dimensions of most rural and urban inhabitants of South Africa. Additionally, the policy trajectory traversed in South Africa has proved inadequate in addressing structural inequalities inherited from the colonial administration (Cardo, 2023; Isike, and Ogunnubi, 2017; Meso *et al.* 2016; Gillanders, 2010; Koma, 2013). The paper concludes that the realization of development management ideals in South Africa is contingent on appropriate policy re-design and implementation that gives reverence to the needs of the poor in an inclusive and redistributive approach. The paper is structured according to the following themes: development administration and development management perspectives, financialization and the heritage of structural inequality including the mineral and energy complex (MEC), theoretical framework, development management and developmental state debates, development policy traversed, political economy and international donor agencies, way forward of leadership attributes and conclusion.

2. From development administration to development management in South Africa: positive change for the majority or the elite minority?

The essence of development administration was its bias towards elitism in that only new politicians and planners were seen as primary facilitators to governing societies (Zafarullah and Huque, 2017; McCourt and Gulrajani, 2010). "Big Government and foreign aid were seen as panacea to development. Additionally, indigenous culture was observed as an impediment to the functioning of western tools of development. Therefore, for the context of this paper, the logic of development administration is used as symbolic characterization of the apartheid regime which exhibited similar traits to that of development administration thinking and practice in that its essence was to disenfranchise many black people in South Africa. However, development administration was later replaced with development management when the new democratically elected government came into power in 1994 which, on paper, signaled a new dawn for South Africa.

Development management relates to a set of value systems that takes account of the fact that the process of management of development infuses politics and thus takes a normative position on the upliftment, empowerment, and inclusion of the poor and marginalized groups (Zafarullah and Huque, 2017; McCourt and Gulrajani, 2010). This is done through devising various capacity building programs and projects that aim to re-integrate the marginalized groups in Society. The paper contests that post 1994 in South Africa, the promise of an inclusive, redistributive, and corrupt free regime is yet to be realized in a "democratic" country; and development management seems to be merely a name change and a pathway of forging a new era of elitism. The aforesaid is evidenced by the growing income disparities, Gini index poverty and unemployment levels and food security status of South Africa.

3. Financialization of the economy and the heritage of structural inequality in South Africa

Financialization of the economy was popularized by the United States of America (USA) in the early 1970's when US President Richard Nixon Collapsed gold parity from the US Dollar which lead to floating currencies that were not backed by anything but government decree (Klink and Denaldi, 2014; Davis, 2013; Krippner, 2012). Thereafter, companies started shifting their business orientation from production and labor intensity towards shareholder orientation suggesting that the interest of shareholders and investors are more important than that of employees. This resulted in an economy that fueled unfettered private capital accumulation and the neglect of the unemployed and unskilled dwellers in the countryside (Klink and Denaldi, 2014; Davis, 2013; Krippner, 2012) Conversely, South Africa appears to have emulated the United States trajectory regarding financialization of the economy. The deregulation of finance led to a concentrated

banking sector with 'monopolistic' banks and state-owned enterprises that are considered too huge to fail.

Thus, in South Africa, government is not responsible for the creation of employment opportunities, instead, it should create an enabling environment for private capital to invest thereby creating businesses and new employment opportunities. However, within the context of development management thinking, it is difficult for private capital to create employment opportunities for people because private companies are mostly interested in servicing the interests of the shareholders by maximizing their returns. It is for this reason that the paper asserts that the pragmatic realization of development management ideals in the age of neo-liberalism and free market capitalism *inter alia* needs leaves a lot to be desired.

The monopolization of public sector enterprises led to little or no competitiveness resulting in cronyism and unjustified public-private-partnership contracts amongst the elite (Block, 2014). Additionally, there has been growth in non-banking financial institutions and rapid, large growth in the use of financial instruments, such as derivatives and securitized debt, associated with increased systemic financial risks for high returns of financial venture capitalist (Block, 2014). Concurrently, many unskilled, uneducated, and incomeless rural and urban inhabitants of South Africa where deliberately excluded from national financial planning that seems to continue feeding the interests of political and financial elite. Like the experience in the USA, finance has been drawn away from long-term productive investments towards speculative reforms in a quest to yield lucrative profits for the elite minority. The aforesaid is substantiated by labor-intensive industries that exhibit a downward trend in employment because robots and sophisticated technologies are being introduced to primarily replace labor cost. A considerable amount of South African firms grew because of the unfair historical financial systems and many those firm have restructured and globalized a considerable share of their business operations abroad (Block, 2014; Brown *et al.* 2014).

A large amount of illegitimate capital flight diverted capital away from productive investments out of South Africa towards the end of apartheid (Mohamed and Finnoff, 2005). As a result, the economy of South Africa has experienced unsatisfactory levels of fixed productive investment and the exclusion of a majority of the isolated rural and urban dwellers in the mainstream economy. The democratization path traversed by the South African economy has been impinged by these obstacles through majority of investment being allocated to activities related to speculative finance and debt-driven consumption (Mohamed and Finnoff, 2005). Therefore, policy makers, and planners find it difficult to create an enabling environment for employment opportunities because finance is misallocated towards servicing interests of big business and keeping up with globalization standards. Therefore, South African rural and urban areas have been on the receiving end through low levels of productive investment, migration of skills labor, inadequate governance and spatial isolation *inter alia* (Meso *et al.* 2016). These conditions make it even harder to visualize the ideals of development management taking pragmatic effect for the benefit of the people of South Africa. Therefore, the paper continues in probing the structures and institutions which are responsible for the formation of financialization.

4. The mineral and energy complex in South Africa: development management for elitism

Financialization of the economy in South Africa rests on the rich history of the structures and institutions which are responsible for its existence. 'Minerals and energy complex' (MEC) is the system of accumulation that laid the foundation of South Africa's economy. The MEC was formed by the relations of government and big corporations in modelling an economy founded on mining and energy (Davis and Kim, 2015; Klink and Denaldi, 2014). Thus, the current economics of space, investment in education, infrastructural financing, mining and energy is directly linked to the decisions which were taken in the colonial era and during the age of mineral revolution in South Africa. The then colonial government decisions which were taken because of racism, sexism nepotism amongst other bias decisions directly affects the contemporary investment decisions on corporate structure and concentration of wealth amongst the elite few. Sadly, the democratization path in South Africa has been shaped by these legacies of apartheid in the quest to feed the interests of the elite who have resources to influence government policy and legislative

direction (Meso *et al.* 2016). Meanwhile, the plight of the income poor, voiceless and alienated members of the rural community is further muted through relief funds, social grants and extra-regional food surpluses and fragmentary local service delivery.

Nonetheless, as a result of Colonialism and apartheid in South Africa, the type of capitalism which was engineered is crafted in a manner that indigenous rural communities are politically and economically alienated from the mainstream production process. Therefore, the structure of the MEC as a system of accumulation was chiefly created by tensions between the oppressed, government and big corporates, including the tensions between Afrikaner and English multinational firms interests and the state (Davis and Kim 2015). Even crony capitalism was racialized and geographically planned through intricate political systems.

Subsequently, a multiplicity of factors which were crafted by the group areas act are responsible for the formulation of shantytowns, townships and informal settlement, which are now synonymous with forceful removal, land disposessions, cheap migrant labor and high profit of the mining and agricultural space. As Meso *et al.* (2016), postulates, rural areas of South Africa where left neglected and reverence was given to urban-centric economic planning by the government and private sector were urban-centric. Rural dwellers who have migrated to the cities for work and residence found themselves having to keep up with urban attractions, investments and development planning efforts which were meant to generate profits for the elite instead of benefiting them. By the time the democratically elected government came into power, it inherited a mining system which had already solidified its illicit practices, and concentration of wealth for the minority (Meso *et al.* 2016; Brown *et al.* 2014). On the other hand, rural areas and their inhabitants were left isolated, underdeveloped and poverty stricken because of urbanity and financialization of the South African economy. Therefore, the paper asserts that rural development planning should rest on the root causes of income, poverty and the rural neglect which were accentuated by the economic trajectory that South Africa traversed post 1994. Thus, as the paper posits, attempts towards alleviating the effects of financialization of the South African economy should be rooted on investing in rural development as an engine to ameliorate national socio-economic woes that were caused by the colonial legacy. The following section drives deep into the theoretical framework guiding the essence of the paper.

5. Theoretical framework

5.1. Principal-Agent Theory

Persson and Sjöstedt, (2012) posits that the principal-agent model has the potential to contribute significantly to our understanding of leadership behavior in at least two ways. It offers the analytical framework for thinking about leadership behavior not as an “error term” or a “black box,” but as a rational response to the opportunity and incentive structure leaders face. In addition, the principal-agent framework provides theoretically anchored tools for labeling what is now commonly brushed aside and, in an ad-hoc manner referred to as “kleptocratic liars, lacking the political will to conduct reforms. The principal-agent theory is increasingly recognized as a valuable approach for investigating public accountability, given its capacity to accommodate a broad array of institutional arrangements and evaluate their efficacy in incentivizing agents to act as desired (Gailmard and Patty, 2012). Particularly within the government sector, the principal-agent theory is widely regarded as the foremost paradigm for explaining research duty and accountability.

According to Persson and Sjöstedt, (2012) the principal-agent theory, a potentially dishonest and non-compliant official must be controlled by a principal who is ostensibly morally upright, honest, and principled. The principal-agent theory is a rational choice model of human behavior that describes a situation in which a so-called “principal” delegates to a so-called “agent” the authority to perform a certain task (Persson and Sjöstedt, 2012; Gailmard and Patty, 2012). The authors’ arguments are that while development management is easily carried out as theory, it is difficult to implement in the practical space. Reasons for this hiccup, *inter alia*, includes that the political landscape in Africa and South Africa in particular which is shaped by politicians who formulated laws, frameworks, plans, and policies with the assistance of bodies and agencies in request. To have an administration that is still partially centralized and characterized by red tapes

in the public sector provides evidence that the chronicles of development management strategically castrated by those 'agents' who should play the implementation role. The paper is grounded on a principal-agent theory to revise the synergy between those in charge of implementing the mandates of 'development management paradigm' against those providing the righteous sacrifice to adopt the said-paradigm as new development vehicle. The subsequent section zooms in on contemporary debates of development management and developmental state.

6. Development management and developmental state: contemporary discourses

Deriving from the argument of this paper, which primarily reflects the pertinent issues regarding the implement-ability of development management paradigm for effective service provision from development administration associated with bureaucracy etc. There are, nonetheless, considerable factoring discourses to delve into that further redesign and restructure the much-purported development management paradigm. The face Development Management paradigm is contemporarily affected with the responsibility of policy alignment and policy configuration to be practical. For instance, the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030, which drives the periodical policy intention and policy direction in South Africa. The Development Management paradigm should draw significantly from the mandate of a developmental state. South Africa is listed amongst other countries that saw the 'right' form the intentions of 'Asian Tigers' model of a developmental state, which primarily speaks industrialization and economic growth. Lastly, ethical, responsive and accountable political leadership should be at the center of every development initiative to achieve the objectives of development management.

Like in many other countries, the concept of development management has raised hopes in many South Africans towards the achievement of the desires of a developmental state. Chalmers Johnson coined the developmental state concept in his seminal book titled *Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Japanese Miracle* in 1982 (Burger, 2014). Maserumule (2007) asserts that, 'in this seminal work, Chalmers (1982) analyses factors that undergird Japan's successful post-war reconstruction and industrial renaissance, which, is the result of the efforts of a planned rational state, which is a developmental state. As the concept of 'management' suggests, a more complex intersectoral, multi-sectoral and interdisciplinary form of integrated and interconnected use of resources to achieve the desired goals. The idea of the developmental state is prominent in policy discussions regarding unemployment, inequality and poverty around the globe which are some of pertinent issues in Development Management. South Africa has amongst other strategies, adopted the National Development Plan 2030 as a framework and a tool for policy desirables.

According to Burger (2014), the developmental state model is the idea associated with high economic development as seen in Japan in the 1950s-80s, South Korea in the 1960s-90s, China since the 1980s and Brazil since 2000. Notwithstanding the usage of the developmental state model by the post-independence government in South Africa in developing the NDP, its policymakers did not contextually analyze the relevance and feasibility of its effectiveness in developing countries like South Africa. As a result, the NDP failed to replicate the impact that Japan, South Korea, China and Brazil achieved through the developmental state model. The critical characteristic of the developmental state model which the post-independence government of the ANC did not thoroughly analyze is the usage of the idea in the NDP as postulated by Evans (1989), Baissac (2009), Pekkanen (2004) in Burger (2014). The developmental state model of the NDP replicated by the South African government from the Asian countries failed to achieve its goals in the post-independence era until today. The developmental state model, as authored by Chalmers Johnson, was developed for the Asian countries' socio-economic and political contexts. The developmental state model is characterized by a singular focus on economic growth, state-centric industrial policy, professional bureaucracy, and authoritarianism, to mention but a few. The developmental state's fundamental tenets are not in sync with the constitutional democratic governance systems adopted by the South African government in the post-independence era. It would be a mirage to think that the NDP, implemented under the developmental state model framework would achieve its objectives. Thus, it is important to get a synopsis of the policy

trajectory in South Africa in assessing its closeness towards assisting in the realization of development management ideals.

7. Policy trajectory towards achievement of development management ideals: from RDP to NDP vision 2030

Financialization of the South African economy post 1994 meant that finance and capital remain concentrated in the hand of the elite minority while political power was negotiated and handed to the African National Congress (ANC) in the form of government administration (Breakfast *et al.* 2019; Brooks, 2017; Kruger, 2016). Post 1994, the aim of the ANC led government was to forge a developmental state through devising policies, programs and projects intended to address the effects of economic alienation of the poor in the economy. The Reconstruction Development Program (RDP) was the initial government blueprint which was meant to be used as a guide to provide basic needs, stimulate the economy, and create an enabling environment for more black people to be integrated as economic stakeholders (Karriem and Hoskins, 2016; Drewes and Van Aswegen, 2013). Unfortunately, the RDP policy was inadequate in dealing with financialization of capitalism because wealth is still in the hands of the elite minority and protected by corporate and legal ingenuity through family trusts and estate planning. Therefore, the aforesaid grim economic conditions of South Africa are indicative of the fact the paradigmatic shift to development management has been accompanied by an unequal structural reality.

The RDP plan failed to lay a solid foundation to forge a developmental state that directly addresses the misallocation of capital in the economy which was engineered by the structures of the financialization process (Karriem and Hoskins, 2016). Many semi-skilled labor force migrated to Johannesburg and surrounding peripheral areas and worked mainly in the mining sector as it was one of the biggest sectors in South Africa post 1994 as created by the infamous Mineral Energy Complex (MEC) (Mohamed, 2005). A considerable amount of black people who have migrated from rural areas became laborers in coal and gold mines confronted by dangerous and life-threatening working conditions. The change and drive towards forging a developmental state was still far from being realized until the Growth, Employment and Redistribution program (GEAR) was initiated when former President Thabo Mbeki came into power in 1999 succeeding former President Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela (Ndambi, 2015).

The GEAR Program was heavily criticized in economic literature for having its core interest on internationalization, globalization, foreign direct investment and international trade (Ndambi, 2015; Koma, 2013). GEAR aimed at attracting investors to create an environment for international business to resume its operations in South Africa. Part of attracting international investors was the favorable currency, the developing state of the country and the company taxation structure which stood at approximately 20 – 0% of company tax (Ndambi, 2015; Koma, 2013). Corporate and legal ingenuity made it possible for big business to avoid taxation legally through sophisticated accounting techniques and tax deduction structures. These structures allowed company chief executive officers and directors to accumulate personal assets, property, and investment in the name of the company. Thus, big corporations would be exempted from paying company tax. Corporate law and government legislative frameworks made the local business environment attractive for foreign investors and their shareholders while neglecting the employees who worked in hazardous industries and got badly remunerated (Ndambi, 2015; Koma, 2013). In essence the rural migrants who are now considered seasonal urban inhabitants find it difficult to maintain administration of two households in both urban and rural areas. The taxation structure is far from being attractive for non-provisional taxpayers who receive salaries and are bound to service income tax at approximately 40% of their gross income (Ndambi, 2015; Koma, 2013). The aforementioned facts are contextual realities which occurred and are continuing to occur in the age of development management which development literature purported that it would contribute to paving a new era of development and governance which is aligned with principles of people centered development. However, the opposite is true, the reality on the ground amongst the middle class and the poor demonstrates bleak economic circumstances with raising costs consumer services, unemployment, low savings and devaluing currencies *inter alia*.

Financialization of the economy is engineered deliberately for the benefit of the elite minority for those closer to economic and political power. Whereas rural and urban areas of South Africa and their inhabitants remain neglected and isolated from the mainstream economy, it is important that development management efforts craft policies and programs that do not merely scratch the surface but rather respond to the real problems that are not addressed by government blue- print plans. After the failure of the GEAR Policy, the Government drafted the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA) in 2005 and got introduced in February 2006. The aim of the ASGISA policy was to introduce programs and interventions that would facilitate growth in the South African economy and halve poverty and underemployment between 2004 and 2014 (Moyo, and Mamabolo, 2014). ASGISA later failed because of lack of organization and coordination between development stakeholders. Infrastructure projects were characterized by delays and underspending in skills and capacity development programs (Moyo, and Mamabolo, 2014). This did not allow people to be capacitated and equipped enough to participate and support infrastructure programs that were rolled out by the government. Therefore, AGSISA is another example of fragmented planning by the government which did not exhibit a clear plan of how redundant labour force in South Africa would be included in the planning and technical skills transfer so that employment opportunities can be allocated on a sustainable basis. Therefore, the failure of the ASGISA policy is another classical example of how development policy failed to be implemented in the age of development management. Clearly, the ideals of development management are not visible in the quality of life and standard of living of most of the South African living below the poverty line. Evidently, the paradigm shift from development administration to development management appears to be a name change brand/name change with no significant alteration in implementation of development management projects and programs.

Contemporary government policy should be crafted with an understanding that prioritizing the poor who have been alienated from the mainstream economy is a step towards dealing with the systemic problems which were caused by financialization and the rise of the exclusionary MEC. The National Development Plan (NDP) vision 2030, is the current South African Policy that all government and private sector efforts are supposedly targeted towards. Its aim is to employ a comprehensive and inclusive approach to addressing the problems of poverty, unemployment and economic competitiveness (Isike and Ogunnubi, 2017; Karriem and Hoskins, 2016; Naidoo and Mare, 2015). The NDP is framed from its six pillars namely: safe and reliable public transport, quality education and skills development, safety and security and quality healthcare.

Notwithstanding the importance of the pillars that the NDP is framed on, there is still little to no evidence of a robust implementation plan to tackle the issues of economic alienation caused by financialization of the economy (Isike and Ogunnubi, 2017; Karriem and Hoskins, 2016; Naidoo and Mare, 2015; Drewes and Van Aswegen, 2013). Investing in quality education for an economy faced with structural unemployment appears counter-productive; and a call for quality formal education should be informed by the availability of employment opportunities in the marketplace. Therefore, the promise of an ideal developmental state in the age of development management rests on political will, ethical leadership, and accountability to implement the people-centered ideals articulated and promised in the policies crafted by the national planning commission of South Africa. The following section presents the political economy of development management and international donor agencies to frame the internationalization of development management and administration discourses.

8. Political economy of development management and international donor agencies

South Africa's financialization systems was shaped by the unforeseen remnants of the unequal distribution of resources, largely perceived during the era of the mineral revolution in south Africa in the 19th century. After the realization of economic monopolization by the superpowers (in this case the Rhodes family) who primarily controlled the mining industry, which gave rise and increasing support to the neo-liberal and capitalist formation that shaped the economic landscape of South Africa. The aforesaid further widened the gap between the poor and the 'elite'. The post-apartheid South Africa remained then with the political life at the absence of the economic power. The system of power-relations was then engineered in south Africa as result of the capitalists who

ordered the state's policy intention and plan. These inequalities in terms of power-relations, resource distribution, the gap between the elite and the lower class has since shaped the political economy of South Africa.

South Africa is presently faced with development challenges and problems such as inequality, poverty, unemployment, poor rural development and poor infrastructural development (NDP, 2030). It could therefore be acknowledged that the colonial imperialism and the apartheid administration of the state, has left South Africa with no choice, but to seek assistance to address the colonial and apartheid economic regressions which crafted the unequal power relations and economic instabilities within the society in south Africa, but mostly poverty. The alternative available was in the form of 'development aid or assistance' in the form of foreign aid. The Bretton Wood institutions: for instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) were deemed suitable together with other donor countries, China being the main donor country presently to assist with donations to the crippling African and South African economy. Therefore, Reci (2014), concurs that the common tool for defining and measuring foreign aid is the Official Development Assistance (ODA). The tool is preferred by the rich world attempting to promote prosperity in the developing world (Gillanders, 2010). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) uses ODA, which comprises loans and grants that multilateral organizations donate to developing countries to promote economic development and welfare. Be it in cash or kind, alternatively, foreign aid is considered a backing by a government or financial institution to indigent states (Selepe, 2021). Without aid, nearly half of the yearly budgetary commitments in many African states would not be fulfilled; that is how much the states depend on aid from well-off countries. As the English adage states, "you cannot bite the fingers that feed you" becomes true as leaders whose states depend on aid would not speak against fake and unwanted goods flooding their markets, as compromising the economic and political sovereignty of African nations (Andrews, 2009; Selepe, 2021).

Financialization by the donor agencies, countries and institutions as accompanied by what is known as 'Structural Adjustments Programs' (SAPs) with an intention to restore the balance of African governments. While the SAPs impose conditions such as devaluing the currency, liberalizing prices, reducing trade barriers, eliminating subsidies, and reducing public-sector employment and expenditure (Plank, 1993). It is because of these factors, that the indigenous 'management' of development in South Africa remains a political and economic issue. Additionally, donor agencies infiltrate the decision-making processes of the recipient countries with an intention to safeguard their investments and interests. For example, the financialization of politics today, has become one of the prominent discourses and critical parliamentary debates in South Africa. Opposing political movements and structures, like the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) allege presidential financialization by the Ruperts and the Oppenheimer's all in the quest to safeguard their economic investment in the country (Cardo, 2023). These issues have shaped the south Africa's political economy apart from the heritage or history of political economy that shaped the administration of the state today. The Ruperts and Oppenheimer family are the rich diamond-and-gold mining magnates who traversed the south African territory back from the mining industrialization in south Africa through Cecil J. Rhodes, presently diverse their business from mining, retail, securing and to health (Cardo, 2023). As the paper asserts, the Oppenheimer and Rupert family are the elitist minority shaping South Africa economic and political landscape 'allegedly' by financialization of political office bearers inter alia which brings the South African government and political leadership closer to the need for political will, ethical leadership and accountability in governance of the affairs of development management in South Africa.

9. Achieving development management: political will, ethical leadership, and accountability

9.1. Developmental management and political will

To realize the mandate of development management, driving factors for its implementation such as political will, ethical choice and accountability are at play. Selepe (2021) asserts that in Africa, governments are political, and the administrative system follows. The political government assumes power for a period of five years, as in South Africa. In most cases, political office bearers

are also sworn in for five years, which triggers a question of job security. With the understanding that most of them might be out of office when the political term lapses, political office bearers tend to engage in corrupt and unethical activities, which include money laundering, nepotism, and favoritism to secure jobs and pave the way for those who will re-employ them. Development management draws a lot of its inspiration and implementation aspiration from policy directives in many countries across the globe and South Africa is not an exception.

South Africa the recent and a much-discussed policy reform is the introduction of the NDP. For which those in the office should produce the greatest extent of political will to realize the objectives of the NDP. In this case, political will is a term used frequently in the context of government action and policy outcomes, though most often a lack of political will is cited to explain policy or reform failure (Marquette, 2022). Therefore, for development management reforms to be successfully implemented, the political office bearers must move from the notion of 'political won't to political will'. Policy makers and policy-oriented scholars concerned with development and reform commonly appeal to "political will" as a cornerstone of development (Persson and Sjöstedt, 2012). The same is pertinent in the effective implementation of development management.

9.2. Development management and ethical, responsive political leadership

The subject of ethical leadership has a form of umbilical-cord relationship with the political will in a sense that, those in charge of steering policy direction have mandate to assume the content of ethical leadership. Africa and South Africa in particular, is characterized by the political system that reigns on a termly basis (Selepe, 2021). The system in Africa is perceived to be a responsible tool used to create and drive different unethical behavior in the public sector (Mafunisa, 2003). In this instance the unethical behavior in the public sector is associated with acts of corruption, greed, bribery, javelin-throwing and post-employment etc. This is because of political leadership responding to a system that is termly in the quest for securing jobs and livelihood. The political administration in South Africa is given a term of five (5) years minimum to ten (10) years maximum. Therefore, Mafunisa (2003) stresses that this system does not supply the safety-net for many political leaders. The aftermath, being a serious involvement in corrupt activities by politicians to secure their livelihood. It may, therefore, be argued nor supported in many forms that for development management paradigm to be effectively implemented, the political leadership as the custodian for policy making may have to be responsive and implement the requirements of any framework that government actions.

10. Conclusion

The socio-economic fabric in South Africa which is largely characterized by financialization of the economy, free-market capitalism and inadequate governance of development interventions makes it difficult to successfully attain the ideals of development management as evidence by its Gini index of 63, the highest in the world. Other neighboring and global countries are not an exception as evidence by their Gini index as follows: Namibia 59.1, Colombia 54.48, Eswatini 54.6, Hong Kong 53.9, Botswana, 53.3, Belize 53.3, Brazil 52 and Zambia 51.3 (Haddad *et al.* 2024). The inequality measures of the aforesaid countries demonstrate deep entrenched structural and policy challenges which could be closely associated to that of South Africa despite the uniqueness of each country. Nonetheless, the apartheid heritage left a structural reality which continues to shape economic trajectory of South Africa characterized by soaring inequality, unemployment, poverty, and corruption inter alia. Management and Governance of development interventions to alleviate the legacy of the past colonial administration continues to be synonymous with corruption, lack of ethical leadership and political will. The national policy trajectory of South Africa post 1994 to date still struggles to address the structural challenges inherited from the former colonial administration. It is for these reasons that the paper concludes that the realization of development management ideals in South Africa is contingent on appropriate policy design which will direct national, provincial and local government planning and service delivery efforts. Furthermore, leadership and management of national, provincial, and

local government should be infused with principles accountability, good governance, ethical leadership and political will and the private sector is no exception. The communities as the intended beneficiaries of development management should be part of the design, implementation, and management of all development interventions in South Africa for the realization of development management ideals.

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